Pasha and Masha are playing the game: they're choose non-zero odds by rotation (Pasha , Masha , Pasha , Masha and so on) . Pasha is trying to make that all satisfy the inequality above. Masha is trying to make that this inequality hasn't solution. Who can win anyway for any if both of them playing optimally?
Notation: denotes the floor function .
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Statement I: Masha can prevent Pasha anyway.
Let ⌊ x ⌋ = 0 , then a j ⌊ x ⌋ 2 + b j ⌊ x ⌋ + c j = c j . If Pasha choose c 1 > 0 then Masha choose c 2 < 0 . And if Pasha choose c 1 < 0 then Masha choose c 2 > 0 . I next steps Masha just copy value of c i of Pasha. So ⌊ x ⌋ = 0 is not solution and Pasha isn't winner because j = 1 ∏ 2 n c j = i = 1 ∏ n ( c 2 i − 1 c 2 i ) = c 1 c 2 i = 2 ∏ n ( c 2 i − 1 c 2 i ) < 0 .
Statement II: Pasha can prevent Masha anyway.
I claim that Pasha can choose b 2 n at which Masha will not be able to choose c 2 n for winning. (How can I prove it? But I know that proof is based on small movements).
What conclusion can be drawn? If Pasha wants to win, than Masha can prevent him anyway. If Masha wants to win, than Pasha can prevent her anyway. If both wants win, then they will interfere with each other anyway. So, nobody can win in this game.