Three prospectors for gold, the Good, the Bad and the Ugly, are standing on the corners of an equilateral triangle, ready to shoot at each other in a final showdown. Good is not a really good shooter, only hitting his target 25% of times. Bad is better, with 50%. Ugly's probability of hitting the target is 60%. To compensate for that, they agreed that the first shooter will be Good, followed by Bad and finally Ugly. They want to stay alive, but they also want to see the other two dead as much as possible. Shooting in the air is also allowed. They select the target randomly if there are two opponents alive and there is no reason to pick any of them.
If all of them know how to optimize their odds, what is the probability for Good to survive? (Select the number closest to your estimation.)
Note: in an earlier version of this problem there was a "They have one bullet each." statement in the text. The current version is the correct one.
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All around, the statement of this problem was not clear. I didn't know that shooting into the air was an option. I also assumed that as long as all three shooters are alive, then each shooter is fixed to shoot at the same shooter each turn. I thought this would be the only way for each to optimize their probability of survival. (But I do not have a proof of this.) And how do we know Ugly will randomize who he is shooting at? I could not follow your computations either. Are you sure they are correct? At any rate, to me it seems that Bad and Ugly would choose to fire at each other. If we assume that, the best option for Good would be to fire into the air, letting Bad and Ugly battle it out until one is hit, so that Good would be guaranteed to get the first shot against his opponent. But then Good's probability of survival in that case is only 1 1 2 4 3 ≈ 3 8 . 3 9 %. If Good fires at Ugly, it is slightly less: ( 3 2 . 9 8 %). The fact that it is less can be explained by the fact that if Good hits Ugly, then Bad gets the first shot against him--not good for Good. If you'd like to see the computations, just let me know.
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Thanks for your comment. I was thinking of putting the option of shooting to the air into the problem explicitly, but I was afraid the problem will become too simple. I was wrong and I will correct for that. I will post a revised version of the problem.
Otherwise I agree with your line of reasoning. Can you let me know how did you get the 43/112? After reading your comments I am no longer sure that the numbers in my solution are correct and it would be helpful to see how did you get your numbers.
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Sure. Let x be the probability that Bad survives the initial gun battle with Ugly. Since Bad shoots first, there is a 5 0 % probability that he wins on the first shot, and a 5 0 % probability that he misses and doesn't win. But if he misses, in order for him to survive, Ugly must miss him, which happens with a 4 0 % probability. If this happens it returns them back to the original state, where Bad's chance of surviving is again x . Therefore, x = 0 . 5 + 0 . 5 ( 0 . 4 ) x ⇒ x = 8 5 . This implies that Ugly's chance of surviving the initial gun battle, on the other hand, is only 8 3 . Having the first shot really gives you a strong advantage. Then do a similar calculation to calculate the probability of Good surviving a one-on-one battle with the survivor. If Bad survives, then Good will have the first shot. He can either hit or miss. If he hits, he survives. But if he misses, then in order to survive, Bad must miss, which brings them back to the original state, in which Good has the same probability of surviving. This forms the equation x = 0 . 2 5 + 0 . 7 5 ( 0 . 5 ) x ⇒ x = 5 2 . The equation for getting into a battle with Ugly gives x = 0 . 2 5 + 0 . 7 5 ( 0 . 4 ) x ⇒ x = 1 4 5 . So, Good's chance of survival in that case is 8 5 ⋅ 5 2 + 8 3 ⋅ 1 4 5 = 4 1 + 1 1 2 1 5 = 1 1 2 4 3 .
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@James Wilson – Your calculation is correct, I made the mistake at stopping too early in the fight between B and U. I will withdraw the problem.
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@Laszlo Mihaly – It's too bad because I liked the reference.
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@James Wilson – You can post a corrected version, if you wish. (It does not feel right for me to correct the problem based on your comments.) If you do that, I will delete the problem.
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@Laszlo Mihaly – I wouldn't mind if you edited it.
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@James Wilson – Thanks. I've updated the answer and options to reflect this.
In the future, if you have concerns about a problem's wording/clarity/etc., you can report the problem. See how here .
Can you show me the computations please
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Hello, Arka Dutta. I showed the computations that gave rise to the answer 3 8 . 3 9 % in response to Laszlo Mihaly already. I'm not sure it represents the optimal strategy of the players, but it is my belief that it does. Note that my assumption is that Bad and Ugly would choose to fire at each other any time both were still alive. This gave Good an incentive to not fire at either while the other two were still both alive because if he hit one of them, then the other would get the first shot against him. But if Good decides to let Bad and Ugly battle it out first, he is guaranteed to get the first shot against his opponent. I just realized that I did not show how I obtained a 3 2 . 9 8 % probability of Good surviving for the case in which Good decides to fire at Ugly. So, here is that computation. Assume that Good instead decides to fire at Ugly any time Ugly is still alive. Also assume that Bad will decide to fire at Ugly any time Ugly is still alive and vice-versa. Let w be the probability Good survives. Let x be the probability Good survives given that only Bad and Good remain, and Bad gets to fire first. Let y be the probability that Good survives given that only Good and Bad remain, and Good gets to fire first. Let z be the probability that Good survives given that only Good and Ugly remain, and Good gets to fire first. Analyzing the possible transitions between states, one finds w = 0 . 2 5 x + 0 . 7 5 ( 0 . 5 y + 0 . 5 ( 0 . 6 z + 0 . 4 w ) ) . x , y , and z are independent of each other and can each be found separately. Their equations are as follows: x = 0 . 5 ( 0 . 2 5 + 0 . 7 5 x ) , y = 0 . 2 5 + 0 . 7 5 ( 0 . 5 y ) , z = 0 . 2 5 + 0 . 7 5 ( 0 . 4 u ) . Solving these equations leads to x = 5 1 , y = 5 2 , z = 1 4 5 . Substituting these in to the original equation and solving for w leads to w = 4 7 6 1 5 7 ≈ 3 2 . 9 8 %.
It is stated that they each have one bullet, therefore good will shoot into the air. Bad will fire at ugly because it gives him a chance of 70% of surviving (compared to 55% if he fires at good). If ugly survives he will fire at bad (because bad fired at him earlier). When taking into consideration all that I wrote here and that they each have one and only one bullet (as stated in the problem). Good has a chance of 100% of surviving if he shoots into the air.
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The answer of 38% is only valid if they have large number of bullets.
I think there is confusion here. Originally, the problem did not have the "They have one bullet each." statement, it was added later. With 1 bullet each the most likely scenario is that good shoots in the air. Bad shoots at Ugly - there is no reason for firing at Good, because Good has no more bullets. If he misses Ugly, (50%) Ugly will select randomly between the other two guys, since neither of them has bullets left. That leaves a 15% chance for Good to die.
I will remove the "They have one bullet each." statement.
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Thank you for your response. I thought that revenge (If he fired at you first) is a good reason to fire at someone (what other reason is there to shoot into the air except the fear of the other guy firing back at you). Thus giving good a chance of 100% of surviving (ugly will fire back at bad because he fired at him first).
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Good will shoot into the air and he will have an 38.39% probability of surviving. See the solution below. Thanks to James Wilson for correcting an error in my original solution.