3 people have each been assigned H or T on their foreheads, based on the results of tossing a fair coin. Each member can see each others' letters but not their own. Their common goal is to win a game with the following rules:
With everyone applying the optimal strategy, what is their probability of winning?
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You do not need to consider strategies for this problem. Since passing does not maximize the chance of winning, this problem simply reduces to "Trying to get the correct answers by guessing" problem. Imagine how the chances reflect only on guessing if you exclude passing for this problem.
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Totally agree with Michael. If I was playing the game, I would consider the flips of the other coins as independent events and those would not influence my "exclamation". Furthermore, the pass option could result in not "winning". You have to say something to win.
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I agree that the other coin choices are independent. That's why every row in the table above has equal probability = 1/8.
Everyone has a right to assert that strategies need not be considered, except that the question asks us to assume that the players use the optimum strategy. I'm not sure what it means to not consider a strategy. Perhaps it means that you guess H or T randomly, or perhaps pass every time. If each player were to guess H or T randomly, then there would be only a 1/8 probability that all three would guess their coin correctly, and win. If everyone passes every time, then nobody would ever win.
If there is another way of playing the game (perhaps without strategies) that results in a better probability of winning, then the 6/8 strategy offered above would not be optimal.
The answer presented above claims to be a strategy that wins 6/8 of the time. Perhaps someone can show that there is an error in the way that it has been presented, and that the 6/8 probability is wrong. But if it's correct, then it is certainly a better strategy than either "random H/T" or "always pass" strategies considered above.
It is very important to understand that, just because I use this strategy, it doesn't mean that I believe my guesses will be right more than 50% of the time. That is, when I see two other players who both have H, I don't believe that it's more likely that I have a T than H. I still believe that T and H are equally likely. However, I can still choose to announce a guess of T. I know that there's a 50% chance that I will be wrong. And yet, it turns out that behaving this way is quite a good idea - if all players adopt this strategy, the probability of winning is 6/8.
This is not true, passing has a crucial impact on the game. If players could pass, they could only win the game if all three made the correct guess. If F is a strategy, and if ( a , b , c ) ∈ W F is a winning position for that strategy, then Player 1 would see ( b , c ) and guess a using strategy F . This means that ( − a , b , c ) would not be a winning position for this strategy (Player 1 would make wrong guess). Thus the map ( a , b , c ) ↦ ( − a , b , c ) is an injective map from W F to W F ′ , which proves that W F ′ has at least as many elements as does W F , which means that the probability of winning with strategy F is at most 2 1 . The strategy: "if a player sees two hats of the same colour, pick 1 , otherwise pick − 1 " has winning set { ( 1 , 1 , 1 ) , ( − 1 , 1 , − 1 ) , ( − 1 , − 1 , 1 ) , ( 1 , − 1 , − 1 ) } and hence has the best possible (for the pass-free game) probability of 2 1 .
"each person, seeing two heads, would guess that they have tails" That's just plain wrong
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Thanks for the opportunity to clarify. People may, or may not, behave in the way I described. But supposing that people behaved that way - making a guess . Half the time they will be correct, and half the time they will be incorrect. I suspect this is what "plain wrong" means. I think it's interesting, and the point of the problem, than even though people would guess incorrectly half the time, the team as a whole ends up winning 3/4 of the time.
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Right. I think it's clear in the problem statement that a person is permitted to submit a guess regardless of his/her internal assessment of it.
If two pass, the third will be correct with his second guess at the latest. 1 in 2.
I haven't proven that this is the optimum strategy.
Be that as it may, I'm personally convinced of it, given the fact that your strategy supplies a win for every correct guess and a loss for every three incorrect guesses (and knowing that correct and incorrect guesses will be equally likely regardless of strategy).
Preface: I totally didn't read the question correctly, so this is all just actually wrong. I thought the question was stated so that the group won if any of them guessed correctly, regardless of incorrect guesses. this is not the case.:
i disagree that 3/4 is actually the solution. i think the answer is 7/8. Firstly, your way i do not believe is the optimum strategy because anytime anyone passes, they throw away a chance to win. Ideally, nobody should pass. Due to the fact that the coin is fair, and one outcome does not affect the next after it has happened, i believe that the optimal strategy would be for everyone to guess H regardless of what they see, resulting in a win-rate of 7/8. Looking at your table above (nicely made, i don't want to try to make one myself), you see that THIS strategy would win in each of the 7 scenarios except for the last. Someone tell me if i am wrong here, but i believe that the optimal strategy leads to a chance of winning of 7/8.
P.S. your strategy WOULD be the most optimal way to play if you only won if exactly 1 person guesses right. My strategy only works (if it does) because multiple people can correctly guess, and the group still wins
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If everyone guesses H, then someone will guess correctly 7 times out of 8 , but it is also true that someone will guess incorrectly 7 times out of 8 . Since the rules of the game say that the players win if somebody guesses correctly and nobody guesses incorrectly, your strategy would only result in a win if the hats were HHH. Thus the probability of your strategy's winning is only 8 1 .
I can not understand why is that if a person sees two heads will surely guess that she/ he has tail? HHH is a valid probability. There is no mandatory condition that at least one head / at least one tail have to be there. Each person's possibility to guess correctly comes to 1/2. and they are independent of each other's probabilities, So, 1/8 wd be the answer... if everyone's correct guessing is needed.. which is not there.
Or just 1/2.... when two other's correct / incorrect guessing is not to be considered.
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They could decide a strategy which told a player who saw HH to choose H, but in this case they did not. Allowing for the fact that players can pass, the strategy here means that the team wins in all cases except where all hats are the same colours, so on 6 out of 8 cases. Given a particular arrangements of hats, what the players will choose to do is fixed. In that sense, there is no randomness to the players' choices. The randomness arises through the uncertainty of what hat arrangement actually exists. Looked in this light, there is some randomness about what each player chooses (each player chooses H with probability 4 1 , T with probability 4 1 and passes with probability 2 1 ), but the different player choices are not independent (it is impossible for Player A to choose H and Player B to choose T at the same time, for example).
While this explanation is sound, the problem isn't worded at all to reflect that this is the optimal strategy everyone will apply. It's stated that there's no communication, which implies there's no information flowing whatsoever between players. A player loses by default if he passes in isolation, so he must guess at random giving a 1/2 chance of success. Then cubed the total probability is 1/8. In the previous comments, the hidden assumption is that an individual's optimal strategy is to pass. Then it follows that everyone would pass and so it's a guaranteed loss. So then the optimal strategy is to do Yesberg's prescription and get at 3/4. But this all assumes the players devise this same strategy, which implies information flowing between players. I'm sorry but this problem isn't worded clearly. Devising an optimal strategy based on what other players are doing implies information flowing implies communication.
This is NOT my strategy. It was submitted by this member https://brilliant.org/profile/fjjvchb-1jjqgm/
So, the strategy each one in the group of 3 people should use is the following (instead of the usual strategy presented in the solution): if a person sees 2 Heads (or 2 Tails), he says Tails (or Heads). That way 2 out of 8 all possible outcomes (cases "HHH", "TTT") at least 1 person (in these 2 cases would be everyone out of 3 people) guesses correctly.
And if a person sees Heads and Tails, he says randomly Heads or Tails (50% each) . Since we have 6 out of 8 all possible outcomes (flips of coins), where 2 persons see "Heads and Tails" in each outcome (out of 8) and they say H or T randomly, and, according to the rules or conditions, at least 1 person guesses correctly with 0.75 probability chance. So we multiply (3/4)*(6/8) = 9/16.
Thus, using the strategy described above the answer then becomes 1/4 + 9/16 = 13/16.
I hope to see if someone would clarify if the reasoning is right, wrong or missing something.
Let V = { − 1 , 1 } n be the set of all possible hat colour arragements, and let d ( a , b ) = 2 1 ( ∣ a 1 − b 1 ∣ + ∣ a 2 − b 2 ∣ + ∣ a 3 − b 3 ∣ ) be the Hamming distance function on V . A strategy is a triple F = ( f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ) , where each f j is a function f j : { − 1 , 1 } 2 → { − 1 , 0 , 1 } . Thus, for a hat arrangement ( a , b , c ) ∈ V , this strategy tells Player 1 to pick f 1 ( b , c ) , Player 2 to pick f 2 ( a , c ) , and Player 3 to pick f 3 ( a , b ) . A player picking 0 represents a player passing. For any strategy F , let W F ⊆ V be the set of colour arrangements for which F wins.
If ( a , b , c ) and ( − a , b , c ) both belong to W F , it is clear that f 1 ( b , c ) = 0 (if Player 1 did not pass, she would be wrong for one of these two configurations). Similarly, if ( a , b , c ) and ( a , − b , c ) both belong to W F , then f 2 ( a , c ) = 0 , and if ( a , b , c ) and ( a , b , − c ) both belong to W F then f 3 ( a , b ) = 0 . Since we cannot have ( a , b , c ) ∈ W F with f 1 ( b , c ) = f 2 ( a , c ) = f 3 ( a , b ) = 0 , we deduce that at least one of ( a , b , c ) , ( − a , b , c ) , ( a , − b , c ) and ( a , b , − c ) must belong to the complement W F ′ of W F .
In other words, for any a ∈ V , there exists b ∈ W F ′ such that d ( a , b ) ≤ 1 . Since the number of elements of V that can be withing Hamming distance 1 of a single element of V is 4 , we deduce that W F ′ must contain at least 2 elements, and hence W F has at most 6 elements. Thus any strategy F has at most 4 3 chance of winning.
The standard strategy F , where each player passes if they see two hats of different colours, and chooses the opposite colour if they see two hats of the same colour, has W F ′ = { ( 1 , 1 , 1 ) , ( − 1 , − 1 , − 1 ) } , and so has optimal probability of success 4 3 .
N.B. This argument can be extended to handle games with 2 n − 1 players.
You have shown that no deterministic strategy can do better. What about non-deterministic strategies, with independent stochastic variables F j ( ± 1 , ± 1 ) ∼ alt ( p j , ± , ± ) ? In game theory, optimal strategies are occasionally of such a stochastic nature; why not here?
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The optimality argument I've always seen with this problem involves the following observation: suppose we run the game N times for some large number N , with assignments chosen randomly. Let W and L be the total numbers of correct and incorrect guesses, respectively (imagine the contestants write their guesses on slips of paper, and we collect all the correct and incorrect slips of paper at the end and count them). Now, the number of winning trials is at most W , and the number of losing trials is at least L / 3 (the L losing guesses must be distributed among at least L / 3 trials, because there are at most 3 wrong guesses per trial.) So the ratio of winning to losing trials is at most L / 3 W = L 3 W . So the probability of winning is at most 3 W / L + 1 3 W / L . But in the limit as N → ∞ , W / L approaches 1 . So that quantity approaches 3 / 4 .
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But this is not a proof, just an investigation...
Does the extension to $2^n-1$ really work? The bound can be set, but the optimal strategy doesn't port well. In fact, symmetrical strategies should imply that for each H/T distribution where you win you need to have the other one a loss (like 4H3T being a win must mean 5H2T or 3H4T is a loss because of the potential backfire). That would mean deterministic strategies are capped at pretty low (I think it's somewhere between 1/2 and 3/4 as n grows larger). Of course, it's late so I might be wrong about all of this.
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The optimal strategy with the 7 player game has a probability of 7 / 8 of winning. You need to consider what is called a (7,4) Hamming code.
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I calculated the occasion that consists 7 players and my answer is 21/32
Could you please tell me what branch of mathematics covers the type of proof you just wrote down. I want to learn how to do that. (I've been studying electrical engineering for the past 5 years. Now that I'm done I can turn my full attention to my real passion Maths 😊)
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"Hamming distance" is a concept from theoretical informatics, in particular the theory of self-correcting codes.
And the rest of it will probably make sense if you take an introductory course on set theory, covering relations, functions, and Cartesian products.
This is NOT my strategy. It was submitted by this member https://brilliant.org/profile/fjjvchb-1jjqgm/
So, the strategy each one in the group of 3 people should use is the following (instead of the usual strategy presented in the solution): if a person sees 2 Heads (or 2 Tails), he says Tails (or Heads). That way 2 out of 8 all possible outcomes (cases "HHH", "TTT") at least 1 person (in these 2 cases would be everyone out of 3 people) guesses correctly.
And if a person sees Heads and Tails, he says randomly Heads or Tails (50% each) . Since we have 6 out of 8 all possible outcomes (flips of coins), where 2 persons see "Heads and Tails" in each outcome (out of 8) and they say H or T randomly, and, according to the rules or conditions, at least 1 person guesses correctly with 0.75 probability chance. So we multiply (3/4)*(6/8) = 9/16.
Thus, using the strategy described above the answer then becomes 1/4 + 9/16 = 13/16.
I hope to see if someone would clarify if the reasoning is right, wrong or missing something.
_ This is NOT my strategy. It was submitted by this member https://brilliant.org/profile/fjjvchb-1jjqgm/_
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To win, someone has to guess correctly, and no-one can guess incorrectly . With your strategy, the team loses with HHH or TTT. In any other configuration (such as HHT) then two people (not just one) have to get their guesses right, since otherwise someone will get a guess wrong. Thus the chance of winning in such a configuration is 4 1 , making the overall chance of winning 8 1 ( 2 × 0 + 6 × 4 1 ) = 1 6 3 .
It is easy to see, that at least two of the letters always has to be the same (by applying the pigeonhole principle) and also that there are 2×2×2 = 8 different outcomes in total (of which all letters are the same in 2 cases (p = 2/8 =1/4) ).
If each of the three members is guessing only (the letter which he/she cannot see on the other members), when he/she sees that the two other members have the same letter on their foreheads (there is at least one of them who sees this) and passes otherwise, then they only lose, when all the letters are the same (in which case there are 3 wrong guesses).
In all the other (6 out of 8) cases they win with 1 correct guess and two passes.
Hence, the probability of winning with this strategy is:
8 6 = 4 3
Would you be able to explain the answer another way, as I still believe that the answer is that they are always guaranteed to win. Here is my reasoning:
1) If a person can see two of the same letter (there will be at least one person, as you also stated), then that person opts to guess. If not, they opt to pass.
2) If all three people choose to guess, then all three letters must be the same. Therefore all three participants will guess correctly, and they win the prize.
3) The only other outcome is that only one person opts to guess. Therefore they can deduce that their letter is different from that on their friends' foreheads, and they win the prize.
The reason to adopt this strategy is that the only communication allowed is stating "pass" or "guess" simultaneously. There are two scenarios could possibly be faced by each person, both letters are the same, or they are different. Therefore, "pass" will refer to one case, and "guess" to the other. As they only win the prize if someone guesses, they do not want to have all three people choose "pass". Due to the case of HHH or TTT, the case of both letters being the same has to be given the reference "guess".
Therefore, all participants will adopt this strategy, which ensures a 100% success rate, making the answer "None of the above"
Where is the fault in my logic? Am I giving the "smart" people too much credit?
Edit: The question was worded in such a way that I thought everyone said "guess" or "pass" simultaneously, then those who chose "guess" had to guess. Now that it has been cleared up, I can see that the answer is 6/8, (or 3/4). You only guess if you can see both the same letter, then guess the opposite letter to that.
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If the first person guesses, there's always a chance of failing the guess (the first person doesn't have any information from other people's guesses).
Even if a person sees that the other two people have the same letter, he/she still doesn't know what his/her letter is. It could be H or T and there is no way to know for sure (because no communication is allowed). Therefore, you can never guarantee a win.
Instead of trying to guarantee a win, Zee Ell's solution employs a strategy to maximize the chance of winning. The strategy is:
As explained in Zee's solution, there will always be either 1 or 3 people who see two of the same letter. If there is 1 person that sees two of the same letter, then that person will guess correctly, the other two people will pass, and the three people will win. If there are 3 people that see two of the same letter, then those people will always lose. However, this happens only 4 1 of the time, because the probability of TTT or HHH is 4 1 . Zee's strategy wins 4 3 of the time.
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The way I interpret the question is that they all choose to either say "pass" or "guess" simultaneously. Then whoever chose to guess, guesses. Is the supposedly correct interpretation that everyone decides to either guess or pass, then decides whether to say "H", "T", or "pass" simultaneously?
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@Douglas Thompson – For this problem, passing refers to giving up. So that does not count.
@Douglas Thompson – You either pass or guess your letter, and this is all done in one step. I will edit the problem to clarify.
I believe that you are assuming that they will be able to tell each other whether or not they are going to guess before they guess, but that would constitute as communicating before the guess. In other words, each player will not know what the other players are going to do before the guess, so in your case 2), everyone guesses, but if they are all adopting the same strategy as in case 1), then the will all guess (i.e. not pass) and they will all be wrong.
Is there something missing in the description? If the H/T assignments are by a fair coin-flip, then the values given are uncorrelated, and merely guessing randomly between "H" and "T" would give a probability if 1/2 + (1/2 * 1/2) + (1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2)) = 7/8.
The answers/comments at the Problem page are closed, so I am reduced to commenting via this route (where few will read it).
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The guesses are not random. They follow a strategy:
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Also, if they chose the strategy of "everybody guesses randomly," then there is a 50% chance the first person guesses right AND a 50% chance for the second person AND a 50% for the third person. Hence the probability of them ALL being right will be (1/2)(1/2)(1/2) = 1/8. This strategy is not optimal since the strategy shown above has a probability of winning 3/4 of the time.
The 'trick' is in the wording, "no one guesses incorrectly" means that everyone with a PASS or CORRECT, would meet this part of the criteria. The second half of the criteria stipulates at least one person must guess CORRECT. The question could have been worded a little better:
e.g. 3. They win if there are no incorrect guesses (only corrects or passes), however, at least one person must have guessed correctly.
Why are you adding probabilities? If the three people simply guess 'H' or 'T' randomly their probability of being correct is 1/8, the last term in your sum.
And how did you come up with this? Instinctively I went straight to using binomials and found out that if they randomly but evenly chose to pass 2/3 of the time so on average 1 of them will vote and that he has a 50% chance of success, you get a probabilty of 0.28240740740740740741
Nice solution. Though I should also point out that you've proven only that 3/4 is achievable, not that it's optimal.
The solution presented by Zee Ell gives a high probability of 4 3 . It is the best strategy that is symmetric and deterministic .
But could there be a better strategy in which different players use a different strategy; or in which they randomly decide whether or not to guess, or what to guess, with a probability dictated by what they see?
One would need to analyze such a general strategy (which involves 24 degrees of freedom, if I am not mistaken), or otherwise prove that no better probability than 4 3 may be obtained. After all, the participants are smart Brilliant members...
Indeed! These members are avid mathematicians who can devise the best strategy!
I thought that no communication is allowed? How so can the problem then be asked in their space? No communication is also a form of communication, so they break the rules even before starting the game... Irrational humans aren't suited for some real-time decision theory set-up. They can out-smart the ones watching if they're just smarter then those making up the rules...(e.g. by watching micro-expressions)
Or they decide that it wouldn't be a fun time to play the game in the first place...
Or they don't give a answer at all until the viewers get tired.
Or they communicate with brilliant members outside the game who tell them which strategy each person should use...
Imo, the problem as stated is way to imprecise.
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The wording of the problem implies they are perfectly rational; i.e., "With everyone applying the optimal strategy, what is their probability of winning the prize?"
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But yes - in the real world... I wouldn't be too optimistic!
There is a way to show that the best probability (with no additional assumptions) is 3/4, which doesn't involve analyzing all possible strategies.
Hint: Think about what the various outcomes are, and how we're assigning the "win / lose" cases.
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I used the hint to solve that one without having to consider whether or not one has to pass.
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I wrote a reply to that effect in one of the popular solutions. See above.
If in at least two different realizations, everyone says 'pass', the probability of loss is at least 8 2 = 4 1 . On the other hand, if there is at least one person in at least seven realizations guessing the value of the coin on their foreheads, by the pigeonhole principle, there must exist at least one person who guesses in at least ⌈ 3 7 ⌉ = 3 realizations. This means that this person guesses a value whenever he sees two different coin realizations for the other two persons. Hence, he errs with probability at least 2 1 4 2 = 4 1 . Thus, it is impossible to design a strategy with an overall error probability better than 4 1 .
You might want to have a look at my solution...
Exhaustively searching all deterministic strategies yields four possibilities to achieve a probability of success equal to 3/4. The symmetric one, as discussed in Zee Ell's post: (TT → H, TH → P, HT → P, HH → T).
The non-symmetric strategy is
and its cyclic permutations.
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Extending my solution, there is a 1 − 1 correspondence between (deterministic) strategies F and the sets W F ′ . The sets W F ′ are what are called 1 -covers, in that every element of V has Hamming distance 1 or less from some element of the 1 -cover.
Maximally effective deterministic strategies are those associated with the smallest possible 1 -covers. There are 4 1 -covers of V that contains 2 elements, namely { ( 1 , 1 , 1 ) , ( − 1 , − 1 , − 1 ) } , { ( 1 , 1 , − 1 ) , ( − 1 , − 1 , 1 ) } , { ( 1 , − 1 , 1 ) , ( − 1 , 1 , − 1 ) } and { ( − 1 , 1 , 1 ) , ( 1 , − 1 , − 1 ) } , so there are 4 strategies with the optimum probability 4 3 of success. The first corresponds to the symmetric strategy. The other three correspond to your three non-symmetric strategies.
I wrote code that picked at random mixed (non-deterministic) strategies, then made incremental improvements. The results: I never found winning probabilities over 75\%. The ones that scored high were always one of the four deterministic strategies listed by Rob Brott.
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Did you use a Genetic Algorithm to evolve the strategies?
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Randomly pick a strategy. Use the gradient of the probability as a function of the 24 parameters to incrementally improve the strategy.
(Similar to: put a drop of water on the surface, follow it downhill until it stops.)
1)There are 8 possible scenarios corresponding to 8 possible outcomes of 3 coin tosses. The optimal strategy cannot guarantee you the victory in every single of the 8 possible configurations, since this scenario is indistinguishable from having perfect knowledge of the outcome of the coin tosses in advance.
2) Hence, there is at least 1 configuration in which the optimal strategy will lose. Since there are groups of symmetric configurations (HHT and its 2 permutations, TTH and its 2 permutations, HHH and TTT), any strategy that loses on 1 configuration will also lose on its symmetric partners. So it is more convenient to construct a strategy that loses on, say, HHH or TTT rather than on one of the others, which have a larger number of symmetric partners.
3) Once the optimal strategy loses on HHH, it also loses on TTT and viceversa. Hence the optimal strategy can't win with a probability greater than 6/8 = 3/4.
4) There exist a strategy that wins with probability 3/4 (if you see HH say T, if you see TT say H, else pass). Hence, by the previous point, it is also optimal.
So I decided to take a jab at the non-deterministic (and symmetric*) case:
Since each player can see the other players, there are three choices in what they see: H H , H T , or T T **. Upon seeing these options, there are three choices in what to say when they all guess: h ("heads"), t ("tails"), or p ("pass"). Let's define ρ X Y → a as the probability of each player guessing a after seeing X Y where X Y ∈ { H H , H T , T T } and a ∈ { h , t , p } . Exhausting the permutations, we have nine different ρ s.
Given this set of ρ s, we would like to find the probability that you will win a random game. First to wrap our heads around this, let's take one of the eight sample games as an example given a set of ρ s; let's try the game where the players are assigned two H s and one T (there are three of these, namely, H H T , H T H , and T H H ). Two of the players have H and see H T and one player has T and sees H H . Given this particular game, in order to win, the players who have H and see H T need to guess h OR p , AND the player who has T and sees H H needs to guess t OR p , AND not everyone can guess p . Hence the probability P ( w i n H H T ) ( = P ( w i n H T H ) = P ( w i n T H H ) ) of winning this type of game is
P ( w i n H H T ) = ( ρ H T → h + ρ H T → p ) 2 ( ρ H H → t + ρ H H → p ) − ρ H T → p 2 ρ H H → p .
Now since there are eight possible games evenly distributed, we may write the probability of winning a random game as
P ( w i n r a n d o m g a m e ) = 8 1 ∑ X , Y , Z ∈ { H , T } P ( w i n X Y Z ) = 8 1 ( [ ( ρ H H → h + ρ H H → p ) 3 − ρ H H → p 3 ] + 3 [ ( ρ H T → h + ρ H T → p ) 2 ( ρ H H → t + ρ H H → p ) − ρ H T → p 2 ρ H H → p ] + 3 [ ( ρ H T → h + ρ H T → p ) 2 ( ρ T T → h + ρ T T → p ) − ρ H T → p 2 ρ T T → p ] + [ ( ρ T T → t + ρ T T → p ) 3 − ρ T T → p 3 ] )
In the last equality, the first line is the game with all H s; the second line, the games with two H s; the third line, the games with one H ; and the last line, the game with all T s. As a quick solidarity check, you can plug in the values of the maximum deterministic solution already discussed in these comments, to check this equation. Doing so gives you 3/4 as expected.
You can eliminate three of these ρ s by normalizing the probabilities: for example, ρ H T → h + ρ H T → t + ρ H T → p = 1 . This will leave you with a six dimensional problem
From this point forward it is a matter of solving for the maximum value of this six dimensional function within the boundaries of 0 ≤ ρ X Y → a ≤ 1 for all X Y ∈ { H H , H T , T T } and a ∈ { h , t , p } . At this point, I'll let someone else take over and do some coding or some really tedious calculus (using a lot Lagrange multipliers). The boundaries of this problem are the most annoying since you have to address them each. There will be 3 6 = 7 2 9 cases since you can choose each variable to be fixed at the lower bound, the upper bound, or be free. Coding will be a lot simpler, but you will have to choose many random starting points in the space to ensure that you are covering all your bases. I suspect that 4 3 is the best as it is in one of the corners or the 9-dimensional solid hypercube, but I would greatly like it if someone with more time than I have right now would check this out. Good luck with coding or math if you feel up to it.
*I feel like asymmetric solutions are outside of the rules since there is no way to communicate and decide who does what.
**Again, they can't determine an ordering so seeing T H and H T have to be the same due again to lack of communication.
I got this no better than 3/8; note that each one has options to either pass or say the correct answer thus probty. of winning is \(\frac{1}{2} )+ \(\frac{1}{2} \times 2 1 )+ \(\frac{1}{2} \times 2 1 \times 2 1 ) = 3/8
However, you chose the answer to be 4 3 , which does not match your answer.
Note that 2 1 + 4 1 + 8 1 = 8 7 , and not 8 3 .
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Suppose that each person, seeing two heads, would guess that they have tails; and conversely if they see two tails would guess that they have heads. Any person seeing two colleagues with different faces showing will pass.
Then we can enumerate all 8 possibilities, and see what happens.
So in 6 of the 8 equally likely cases, the team wins. Probability is 6/8 = 0.75 for this strategy. I haven't proven that this is the optimum strategy.