The Well-known MU Puzzle

Logic Level 3

In Douglas Hofstadter's book, Godel, Escher, Bach , he proposes the following puzzle about formal systems.

Axiom: MI is an axiom.

Theorem: The axiom is a theorem by default. All the (and only all the) strings that can be derived using the following transformations on a theorem is also a theorem.

Formal Rule Informal Description Example
x I → x IU Changing any terminal I to IU MII MIIU
M x → M xx Double the string after M MIU MIUIU
x III y → x U y Replace three I s with an U MIIIU MUU
x UU y → xy Remove an occurence of double U s MUUI MI

Problem: Is MU a theorem?


Guessing the answer to this problem is not very difficult. However, an interested problem solver could explore this questions:

  • If your answer was yes, what is the proof of the MU theorem, i.e, what is the sequence of transformation rules that will take you from MI to MU ?
  • Is the MIU system decidable, i.e, is there a computer program to decide if a given string is a theorem?
  • If not, is the system semidecidable, i.e, is there a computer program that will eventually tell if a string is a theorem, but never tell if it isn't?
Yes No

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2 solutions

Michael Mendrin
Jul 8, 2016

We first observe that letting I = 1 I=1 and U = 0 U=0 , while M = 1 M=1 , then all binary numbers, with the first digit being M = 1 M=1 , represents all possible strings starting with M M and containing any number of I I s and U U s following. Hence, we can assign a natural number B B , starting at 2 2 , to any given string.

Next, we can assign digits 0 , 1 , 2 , 3 0,1,2,3 to the four "Formal Rules", so, again, with the first digit arbitrarily being 1 1 , all possible sequences of applications of such rules can be represented by all natural numbers in base 4 4 , convertible to natural numbers A A in base 10 10 , thus starting at 4 4 .

A "proof" is simply the function P ( A ) = B P\left(A \right) = B , which assigns the number representing a sequence of rules applied to the number representing a sequence. We can create a table starting with A = 4 A=4 , and increment successively to any number of arbitrary size. Assuming that for a table of finite length B B is present, we can say that eventually determine that B B "is a theorem", but this is assuming that B B is listed in such a table of any finite length. It may not.

In order to determine whether or not B B necessarily exists in such a table of some finite size, we cannot resort to a simple successive application of the formal rules, for reasons given above. As an analogy, suppose given positive integers a , b a, b defining points in a lattice, is there any a , b a, b such that the distance to the origin is some integer multiple of 3 \sqrt{3} ? We can do a successive search of all possible such pairs of integers, and regardless of how long the search takes, it never seems like any such a , b a, b can be found. Proof of non-existence of such a pair a , b a, b sometimes (or often!) has to appeal to reasoning that is outside the limited set of "Formal Rules". "Is there a computer program to decide if a given string is a theorem?" Go see AA's answer, but the salient point being made here is that the "Formal Rules" clearly wasn't sufficient to settle the issue. This is the reason why "definitions and axioms" in mathematics keeps expanding, which was the point of Godel's Theorem.

Hmmm , your proof seems to be somehow a use of Godel's numbers at the point of making a bijection between a number which will be the correspondent value of any binary string starting with 1 and the same with the "rules" number. Great!

The formal description used by you is indeed very very interesting as an abstract understanding of this compound use of the 4 rules considered and indeed it may point to the fact that any predication about their iterative use as you said can insufficient or (with the terms of Godel's theorem) incomplete thing at which I haven't thought until you made this point which I find extremely useful as you explained the fallacy which I did here. Indeed , I can't use the formal rules to prove the inexistence of a set of moves since for the reasoning to work it would have to transcend any predication about the compound obtained as an iterative application of this rules which can't be checked just by the growth of the compound alone in the set of rules considered if there will ever be a mapping between the 2 Godel numbers as you showed. Yet the argument still works as a result of a predication about the characteristics of this rules which makes me a little confused. I don't completely understand at this point if this predication about the compound use of rules is part of the system , by the fact that they are "outside" predication being necessary to observe the subtle difference between being in and out , of rules or not so if I understood right your argument that I can't use this kind of reasoning or rather of expressing things in this manner says that my argument works because of outside predication about rules not about inside one , right ?

A A - 4 years, 11 months ago

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There's actually not a bijection between A A and B B , as it is possible that more than one B B can result in a particular A A . Moreover, it's also possible that for some A A there is no corresponding B B . I merely wanted to demonstrate that there can be an easily implementable "computer program" that would eventually find that a particular string is a theorem, IF it's a theorem! That is, the semi-decidable case.

Whether or not "any" computer program can possibly always determine whether or not a particular string is a a theorem in finite time is what I deferred to you. I haven't studied this problem enough to know if there is any algorithmic approach of always being able to decide that, in the particular instance MU sequences. I have that book Godel, Escher, and Bach buried somewhere in my garage, maybe it's time for me to dig it out and have another look at it.

Michael Mendrin - 4 years, 11 months ago

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Haha , right there is not a bijection. Hm , I suppose I understood your comment wrong now that I see what you explained here , thanks.

I'll try to deepen what you said more until I understand it properly. That book would be easily found on the net btw , though I suppose you are more of an old fashioned person and like having material book and , since maybe I will want to read it to , do you recommend it or don't find it good ?

A A - 4 years, 11 months ago

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@A A I remember it being quite good, but the last time I looked was literally in a previous century, i..e. before 2000. Okay, I guess it's time now for me to go build that blasted shelf system in my garage so I can find my books again.

What I like about this subject is that if we imagine proofs to be essentially algorithmic, i.e., implementable by computer, then that opens up meta-mathematics, i.e., viewing proofs themselves to be no more than mathematical expressions, so that then at another level, we can analyze them. In fact, this is already being done in abstract algebra, as for example in Category Theory . We can proceed upwards in even higher "meta" levels. This subject helps give one an intuitive understanding of how this works--and why Godel's Theorem makes this a necessity.

Michael Mendrin - 4 years, 11 months ago

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@Michael Mendrin Exactly! Or in other words reflexive thinking about them , which is actually after all interestingly linked with the subjected of auto-referential structures which that book has from what I heard about it , though to me that thesis doesn't sound to be too coherent.

I think we always have that reflexive thinking about mathematics and therefore make meta-mathematcial statements but not in a systematic and rigorous way. Trying to completely understand and deepen things always implies a reflexive understanding of so to say the "what" and therefore , knowingly or not , implies a reflexive characteristic and I say this because I made this observation from experience in thinking at such problems.

The fact of being thought of proofs, they being the subject , this very fact is already the seed of meta mathematical concerns and appears anyway implied as you said in abstract algebra and category theory though they are not concerned with meta-mathematics consciously but with trying to completely understand things. Anyway , I always though that such a try to understand anything at a point somewhere implies trying to understand understanding itself that is that a point when you look so deeply in a thing to the point to which it is completely clear you see yourself and your thinking in it inseparable from the things itself.

Abstract algebra and also category theory (though this one more weakly) are examples of this phenomena under such a vision as they manifest that direct exigence of complete understanding anyway and in not so modern terms "absolute" knowledge of things. Yet , I think that , as in any real compelte understanding once this reflexive "meta" level is reached it will complete the gaps and questions of the other levels which remained unclear on the account of anyway being reflexive so to say. That is a trait actually of any auto-sustainable system of thought and understanding which is organic in it's structure. At some point the understanding of some level will complete the udnerstanding of another level in this non-homogeneous manner making it a compelte unitary system in which , at least structuraly if not by knowledge , the entire is solid and stable.

Haha , this are stories of the quest for knowledge and complete understanding which reminds me of another book though very vague to some.

I'll try to look at that book then if you recommend it. I found it in a library one day and looked at it (I have actually found out today that it is from 1979)and appeared to me just by that superficial look as trying to go on a current of the contemporary way of trying to formalize everything to the point it gets superficial, tendency which t find unsuitable for an authentic understanding of things as it would lead to an falsified image of the world by the lack of substance and content. Also the thesis by which on the account of being reflexive you can get to obtain emergent traits sounds to me more like alchemy than a serious hypothesis but it may be a lot better argumented than I thought and deserves a try anyway , thanks!

A A - 4 years, 11 months ago
A A
Jul 8, 2016

Supposing that MU isn't an already given theorem , and this supposition should be made because otherwise it wouldn't make sense to verify it on the account of the operations presented , it's impossible to obtain by such operations MU starting with MI.

To prove this proposition consider , formally , the way the index of the operations provided works in it's innate structure starting by the string MI anyway. To obtain MU starting from MI you should get rid of all the Is in the string of MI and all the U's such that you get MU which is only possible by using the operation of replacing III with an U and by the operation of removing 2 U's. This means therefore that the configuration anterior to the application of this operations should contain an odd number of Is and an odd number of repeating U's such that any excess even U's can be eliminated until there remains only one U. Observe further that it order to obtain such a sequence this should be done by working in some way with the operations. This is a principal or understanding by principles which helps reply to the harder questions put later in the problem. Looking therefore at the problem from the point of view of how the operations lead to outputs when are combined deepens elementary understanding.

It sufficient to prove just one of this necessary conditions is not met by the use of the available operations , namely that the number of I's can't be taken away by the use of the operations , in the conceiving of that principal understanding.

Observe that there are 2 possible available operations to use starting from the string MI at first , namely the first 2 listed operations. Observe that you can't obtain an odd number of Is by the operation of doubling the string after M alone as doubling will always get you strings of an even number of Is nor by using a combination of the 2 initially available operations as using the first operation listed you would get from the string by the following reasoning. Using a combination of the first 2 operations firstly to get a sequence which will be good implies , since the first operation has the characteristic that once applied can't be applied a second time without using some intermediate operation because after it's application the sequence will have the terminal element and U and not an I , as required for this operation in order to work , that the resulting output depends on the second listed operation. This because after using the first 2 operations a number of times you will get a sequence like IUIU with I repeating an even number of times before each U where each of the I * n times U sequence repeats for an even number of times remaining therefore to prove that any such resulting sequence can't be transformed in a sequence with an even number of Is and this can be proved because no matter the sequence of IU in each there are an odd nubmers of I's which can't be taken away just by the use of removing 3 I's as the nubmer of removing I's is , because it will be as a result of the doubling operation a power of 2 not divisible with 3 anyway making it impossible for the number to get 0 Is.

Observe that it is sufficient to consider just this characteristic related to the number of Is being divisible with 3 or not to decide anyway if some given string is reducible to the state MU or if it is not , being therefore decidable.

Nonetheless , for cases in which this characteristic related to the divisibility of I is not important , which can be conceived for some variations of the prolbm it can be that , until the moment in which a general understanding is obtained is not decidable. Another interesting problem would be to consider for what specific use of operations proposed , out from some set of operations a problem can be decidable or not which will be a good exercise towards that meta-logical udnerstanding intended anyway.

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